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a b s t r a c t
Previous studies show that in contrast to evidence that share issue privatization (SIP) in most other coun-
tries have improved ﬁrm proﬁtability, China’s SIP of the 1990s had no such effect. We argue that the main
reason for the failure of China’s SIP is likely to have been the weak institutional environment in place at
that time. We examine China’s SIP in a more recent period in which the institutional environment was
greatly improved. Using a matching sample method, we ﬁnd that SIP ﬁrms continued to experience neg-
ative post-SIP proﬁtability changes in our sample period. However, their performance decline was signif-
icantly less than that of their matched non-SIP SOEs. We also ﬁnd that the introduction of the
independent director rule helped to improve ﬁrm performance. Our results reconcile the ﬁndings of
the SIP effect in China with international evidence and illustrate the importance of a developed capital
market to ensuring the success of privatization schemes.
 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Share issue privatization (SIP), in which government sell shares
in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to private investors through
IPOs and list the issuing companies on the stock market, has been
the most popular method of privatization and been successful in
improving ﬁrm efﬁciency and proﬁtability. Megginson and Netter
(2001) review a broad range of SIP studies and conclude that SIP
almost always improves ﬁrm efﬁciency and proﬁtability, regard-
less of whether it takes place in transitional or non-transitional
economies.1 In a recent paper, Gupta (2005) also ﬁnds evidence that
partial privatization has a positive impact on ﬁrm proﬁtability. Shle-
ifer (2005) provides an in-depth analysis of why private ownership is
superior to public ownership in the context of most economic activ-
ities, a theoretical argument supportive of documented empirical
results.
Transforming a pure SOE into a SIP ﬁrm is expected to improve
ﬁrm performance for at least two reasons. First, a pure SOE is not
usually proﬁt-oriented. It is part of the central economic plan
and serves the government’s ﬁscal and social objectives. By con-
trast, a SIP ﬁrm, following the injection of private capital and with
a new ownership structure that includes private investors, is more
proﬁt-oriented. Second, SIP ﬁrms are also listed on the stock mar-
ket. As Gupta (2005) argues, the stock market can serve as a pow-
erful monitoring and disciplinary tool that improves a ﬁrm’s
corporate governance. These factors should lead to better post-
SIP performance.
However, studies of China’s SIP ﬁnd that in the early stages (i.e.,
the 1990s) ﬁrm proﬁtability did not improve. For example, based
on a sample of 634 SOEs that went through the SIP process be-
tween 1994 and 1998, Sun and Tong (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁrm proﬁt-
ability, as measured by return on sales (ROS), decreased from
16.5% in the pre-SIP period to 11.4% in the post-SIP period.2 Simi-
larly, Wang et al. (2004) examine 793 SIP ﬁrms and ﬁnd that ROS de-
creased 8.3% around the time of a ﬁrm’s privatization. Given that
these results conﬂict with the evidence from studies undertaken in
other parts of the world and that the Chinese economy experienced
robust growth during this period, they are somewhat surprising.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) offer explanations for why privatiza-
tion might not work from a corporate governance perspective. For
example, privatization will not work if it does not create major pri-
vate shareholders, if there is an absence of protection of minority
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1 There are exceptions though. For example, Harper (2002) ﬁnds that although the
overall effects of privatization are positive, Czech ﬁrms privatized in the ﬁrst wave
experienced a decline in performance.
2 Sun and Tong (2003) use a larger set of performance measures than proﬁtability
and ﬁnd some improvements after SIP measured by real net proﬁts, real EBIT, and real
sales. However, as we argue later, these measures are inappropriate for measuring
proﬁtability changes in the Chinese SIP setting because all SIP in China has involved
primary offerings and resulted in an enlarged asset and equity base.
Journal of Banking & Finance 33 (2009) 2322–2332
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Banking & Finance
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / jbf
Published in Journal of Banking and Finance, 2009 June, Volume 33, Issue 12, Pages 2322-2332
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.06.008
shareholders, and/or if the management is incompetent.3 All three
of these problems exist in the early SIP ﬁrms in China.
First, China’s SIP, while introducing private investors to the for-
mer SOEs, did not result in a transfer of effective control from the
state to private investors. The original objective of the Chinese gov-
ernment in implementing the SIP was to raise capital for state-
owned enterprises. The motive for SIP in China was thus quite dif-
ferent from that in eastern European countries, which ﬁrst experi-
enced a change in political regime, followed by privatization.
Governments in the eastern European countries usually gave up
control of SIP ﬁrms. In contrast, there was no shift of political re-
gime in China, and its privatization program can be characterized
as a reluctant one. Rather than being seen as a way to strengthen
the market, share issue privatization was seen as a way to
strengthen the state.
Second, even where the state maintains effective control over
SIP ﬁrms, if the stock market can provide meaningful minority
investor protection through market institutions and mechanisms,
SIP might still work. However, in the early stages of China’s SIP
process, these institutions (such as independent audit and inde-
pendent director) and mechanisms (such as cumulative voting
and proxy voting) were near to non-existent. The stock market
was seen as an experiment and did not feature in any of the Com-
munist Party’s ofﬁcial public reports until 1999 (see Walter and
Howie, 2003).
Finally, the management of SIP ﬁrms was mostly inherited from
their predecessor SOEs, and was accountable to their government
controlling shareholders, thus limiting the potential for improved
level of management expertise after SIP.4
All three factors outlined above might explain why China’s SIP
in its early stages did not improve ﬁrm proﬁtability (Sun and Tong,
2003; Wang et al., 2004). Privatization per se, and especially partial
privatization that does not involve a change of control or does not
establish a meaningful level of investor protection, is no guarantee
of success.
In this paper, we re-examine the effect of China’s SIP in a more
recent period (1999–2002). This period is widely seen as a new
stage in the development of the Chinese stock market and SIP pro-
gram. After an experiment lasting eight years, China’s stock market
was ﬁnally recognized in an ofﬁcial public report of the Communist
Party in 1999 (Walter and Howie, 2003). The private sector began
to be seen as an integral part of the socialist economy. Giant SOEs
in mainstay industries, such as national petroleum and telecom-
munications companies, started to go through the SIP process.
Furthermore, the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997 exposed the gov-
ernance weakness of Asian securities markets (Johnson et al., 2000)
and strengthened the Chinese regulator’s will to build stronger
market institutions and mechanisms. Regulatory authority over
securities market was consolidated into the China Securities and
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 1998, a development that was
quickly followed by the implementation of the ﬁrst Securities
Law on July 1, 1999. The CSRC, separately or in conjunction
with other government agencies and the legislature, moved fast
to establish modern market institutions and governance
mechanisms.5
Given these improvements in Chinese investor protection, we
believe it is worthwhile re-examining whether or not the SIP pro-
cess during this recent period was successful. The fact that the
state sector still accounted for 37% of China’s GDP in 2006 makes
this question an important one. SOEs are still inefﬁciently run. Par-
tial privatization through the SIP seems to be the only feasible way
forward, and evaluating whether or not SIP works and, if so, what
makes SIP work, could shed light on the future of China’s economic
reforms.
Using a sample of 149 manufacturing ﬁrms that were wholly
state-owned before being restructured into shareholding compa-
nies and listed on the stock exchanges through the SIP process,
we re-examine the effects of SIP on ﬁrm performance. We use a
matching sample method to pair SIP ﬁrms with non-SIP SOEs
and identify the effects of SIP. Most empirical studies on SIP effects
use the direct comparison method developed by Megginson et al.
(1994) (MNR). As Megginson and Netter (2001) point out, the
MNR method may involve a selection bias problem, because ‘‘gov-
ernments have a natural tendency to privatize the ‘easiest’ ﬁrms
ﬁrst, those SOEs sold via share offerings may well be among the
healthiest state-owned ﬁrms.”
Our data suggests that the selection bias problem is extremely
severe in China. The SOEs that went through the SIP process and
listed on the stock markets were those that had performed better
than their peers. In our sample, we ﬁnd that before IPO, 99% of
SIP ﬁrms were in the top 20% of SOEs in terms of total assets,
95% were in the top 20% of SOEs in terms of ROS, and 100% were
in the top 20% of SOEs in terms of ROA. The average ROS before
SIP was 18.5%, and the average ROA before SIP was 13.3%. This sug-
gests that the SIP process has involved severe selection bias. If it is
not controlled for, there is a tendency for the superior performance
in the pre-SIP period to revert to normal levels in the post-SIP per-
iod, leading to negative performance changes.
Previous studies (e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1996) suggest that a
matching approach is appropriate to control for the selection bias
problem. While SIP studies such as Megginson and Netter (2001)
also recognize that a pre-event performance matching approach
is preferred, matching data is very difﬁcult to obtain for such stud-
ies because the information for non-listed ﬁrms is not usually pub-
licly available. We obtained access to a State Statistical Bureau of
China database which contains enough balance sheet and income
statement information on all unlisted manufacturing SOEs over
the period 1998–2003 to make matching possible. The matching
approach also controls for the impact of economy-wide ﬂuctua-
tions in the performance of SIP ﬁrms.
For each SIP ﬁrm, we ﬁnd a matching SOE in the same manufac-
turing industry that was of a similar size and had similar pre-SIP
performance (Barber and Lyon, 1996), but has not gone through
the SIP process. We then compare the post-SIP proﬁtability of SIP
ﬁrms with that of SOE ﬁrms to identify the real effect of SIP on ﬁrm
performance. We measure proﬁtability using ROS. We ﬁnd that the
ROS of SIP ﬁrms in our sample declined, conﬁrming ﬁndings in
prior studies: median ROS decreased by a signiﬁcant 4.1%. How-
ever, we also ﬁnd that the matching SOEs experienced a greater de-
cline in ROS, with a fall of 7.4%. In other words, SIP ﬁrms
outperformed matched SOEs by a statistically signiﬁcant 2.5% mar-
gin.6 Our evidence thus suggests that SIP had a positive effect on
ﬁrm proﬁtability in China during the recent period of stock market
development. Our result holds for both revenue privatizations and
control privatizations, is robust as we vary the ROS measurement
horizon, and holds after controlling for other variables.
In further tests, we ﬁnd that over our sample period (1999–
2002), the outperformance of SIP ﬁrms relative to matched SOEs
increased signiﬁcantly, indicating that as China built up investor
protection and corporate governance mechanisms, the SIP process
became more successful. In particular, we ﬁnd that the introduc-
3 We are grateful to the referee for making this point to us.
4 As late as 2007, the government arranged the chairmen or CEOs of China Telecom,
China Netcom, and China Mobile to swap posts, though these three ﬁrms are listed
ﬁrms in competition with one another.
5 See Section 2 for more detailed discussion of the changes.
6 This conclusion depends on the assumption that the SIP ﬁrms and their matched
SOEs were drawn from the same population of SOEs. We thank the referee for
cautioning us on this assumption and discuss it in Section 3.
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tion of independent directors to corporate boards in 2001 had a
signiﬁcantly positive impact on SIP ﬁrms’ relative performance.
This study potentially advances our understanding of the priv-
atization mechanism and its effects. Most of the literature analyzes
privatizations involving a transfer of control from the state to pri-
vate investors. Partial privatization with no transfer of control has
been largely dismissed as ineffectual in policy debates and its ef-
fects have been overlooked in the literature (Gupta, 2005). Our
study indicates that partial privatization might still work in spite
of the absence of a change of control if the stock market plays a role
in monitoring and disciplining the state shareholder. Relative to
pure state ownership, the SIP process can create healthy checks
and balances for SIP ﬁrms. Whether or not SIP works thus crucially
depends on whether market institutions and governance mecha-
nisms are put in place to protect minority (private) investor inter-
ests. During the period we study, the Chinese government
established a host of modern market institutions and governance
mechanisms. Our results appear to support the view that these
institutions and mechanisms collectively improved the results of
the SIP process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two re-
views China’s stock market development and SIP process, and out-
lines the motivation for our study. Section three introduces the
new dataset and our matching approach. Section four reports our
empirical results and we present our conclusions in section ﬁve.
2. Development of China’s stock market and motivation of this
study
In the late 1970s, China still remained a centrally controlled
economy, with the government controlling and planning almost
all economic activities. The government controlled not only the
capital allocation process, but also production plans, labor markets
and product markets. As a result, SOEs were highly unproductive
and inefﬁcient. The concept of proﬁt maximization was entirely
absent from SOEs. Rather, the objectives of SOEs included fulﬁlling
the government’s economic plans and serving social objectives
such as employment (e.g., Lin et al., 1998)7.
In the 1980s, the Chinese government adopted various mea-
sures aimed at reforming SOEs. These measures were mainly to
give more latitude to SOE management in managing their ﬁrms
and to align the goal of SOE management with that of the govern-
ment. These reform measures were successful to certain extent (Li,
1997). However, by the late 1980s, it was clear that the govern-
ment could no longer ﬁnance all SOEs itself, and that the reform ef-
forts taken thus far had not resulted in sufﬁcient improvements in
SOE performance. A dramatic reform step was thus taken with the
opening of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 1990
and 1991, respectively. There is little doubt that the original pur-
pose the government had in mind for the stock market was to raise
capital for SOEs through partial privatizations while retaining its
status as the controlling shareholder (Walter and Howie, 2003).8
To serve this ﬁnancing need and keep the new market under
control, the central bank (the People’ Bank of China, or PBC) was
designated as the stock market regulator and adopted a quota sys-
tem for selecting SIP candidates.9 Under this quota system, the PBC
speciﬁed the amount of shares ﬁrms were allowed to issue to the
public each year. The PBC deliberately kept the quota low in the
1990s to ensure the market was kept under control. As a result, de-
mand for share issuance far exceeded the amount of shares allowed
under the quota system, which created incentives for governments
to choose ﬁrms that urgently needed capital to participate in the
SIP instead of selecting ﬁrms that could produce sustainable proﬁts.
This early period in the stock market and SIP process was char-
acterized by a lack of the market institutions and mechanisms re-
quired to discipline listed ﬁrms and protect minority investors’
interests. For example, it was not until 1996 that the Chinese Insti-
tute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (CICPA) issued the ﬁrst set of
auditing standards, and China did not promulgate a set of account-
ing standards in modern sense until 1998.10 Listed ﬁrms were re-
quired to have a board of directors, but nearly all directors were
members of the management team of either the listed ﬁrm or one
of its controlling shareholders. To make matters worse, shares
owned by Chinese governments at all levels were made non-tradable
to avoid diluting state control, which meant that controlling share-
holders could not beneﬁt from share price appreciation, reducing
their incentive to improve SIP ﬁrms’ operating performance.
Studies on China’s SIP ﬁnd that the SIP program of the 1990s did
not improve ﬁrm proﬁtability. In a study based on a sample of 634
SOEs that went through the SIP process during the period 1994 to
1998, Sun and Tong (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁrm proﬁtability, as measured
by net income divided by sales revenues (ROS), decreased from
16.5% in the pre-SIP period to 11.4% in the post-SIP period. Simi-
larly, Wang et al. (2004) examine 793 SIP ﬁrms and ﬁnd that ROS
decreased 8.3% around the time of privatization. Lin et al. (1998)
also suggest that the SOE reform of the 1990s was far from
successful.11
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) offer explanations for why privatiza-
tion might not work from a corporate governance perspective. For
example, privatization will not work if it does not create major pri-
vate shareholders, if there is an absence of minority shareholder
protections, and/or if the management is incompetent. In fact, all
three problems existed in the early SIP ﬁrms in China. First, while
the SIP program introduced private investors into the former SOEs,
it did not result in a change in effective control. The government, as
the controlling shareholder, still exerted effective control over SIP
ﬁrms. Second, as we argue above, the new stock market lacked
the institutions (e.g., independent auditing or independent direc-
tors) and mechanisms (e.g., cumulative voting or proxy voting) re-
quired to protect minority shareholders’ interests, thus
diminishing the monitoring and disciplinary role of the stock mar-
ket. Third, SIP ﬁrms’ management teams and boards were effec-
tively appointed by controlling shareholders, and in most cases
were inherited from their predecessor SOEs.
In this paper, we revisit the issue of whether China’s share issue
privatization program improved ﬁrm proﬁtability using a more re-
cent SIP sample (1999–2002). We conduct this study for three
reasons.
First, as Allen et al. (2005) ﬁnd, China’s rapid economic growth
in the last two decades was mainly driven by the private sector.
The private sector outperformed not only the state sector, but also
the listed sector. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that although the
state sector’s contribution to the economy as a whole had been
shrinking, it still accounted for 37% of China’s GDP in 2006. The
vast majority of the state sector is still inefﬁciently run, and how
7 Boubakri et al. (2009) ﬁnd that even in strategic industries, there exist a negative
effect of state ownership on proﬁtability and operating efﬁciency.
8 A general perception among government ofﬁcials, and people at large, was that as
long as the government controlled the shareholding companies (former SOEs), the
socialist state nature of these companies did not change. If it were not for this
perception, share issue privatization would not have been possible in China.
9 Throughout the 1990s, nearly all IPOs were share issue privatizations of former
SOEs.
10 Prior to 1998, Chinese accounting standards were based on Soviet-style systems,
which were designed to suit the needs of a central planning system rather than to
serve shareholders’ informational needs.
11 Some senior Chinese government ofﬁcials also expressed similar concerns. For
example, Sheng Huaren, the former Minister of the State Economic and Trade
Commission, admitted that ‘‘many profound contradictions and problems exist in the
SOE reforms and they have not yet been solved” (Li, 2001). We thank the referee for
making this point to us and providing supporting materials.
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this part of the economy should be reformed has been a hotly de-
bated topic in recent years. SIP is still one of the main candidates
for resolving this problem, and evaluating the effects of the SIP pro-
gram based on more recent data will contribute to the debate and
its ultimate resolution.
Second, and more importantly, the market institutions and
mechanisms that protect minority shareholders’ interests have
been greatly improved in recent years, and this change could
potentially improve the effectiveness of the SIP process. In this re-
spect, the turning point came in 1998. The Asian ﬁnancial crisis of
1997 exposed the governance weakness of Asian securities mar-
kets (Johnson et al., 2000) and strengthened the determination of
Chinese regulators to build stronger market institutions and
mechanisms.
In April 1998, the China Securities and Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) was recognized as the sole regulatory body for China’s secu-
rities market, inheriting regulatory power over the securities mar-
ket from the Securities Committee of the State Council and the
People’s Bank of China. This consolidation of market regulatory
power greatly enhanced the efﬁciency of market regulation. On
July 1, 1999, the ﬁrst Securities Law came into effect. For the ﬁrst
time, the Securities Law formalized the issuance, listing, and trad-
ing of securities in China’s domestic market. It also provided a sys-
tem of standard mechanisms designed to protect the interests of
investors and clariﬁed the ﬁduciary duties of market participants.
After the consolidation of regulatory power in the CSRC and the
enactment of the Securities Law, the CSRC moved aggressively to
promote investor protection and discipline listed ﬁrms. In 1998,
the CSRC standardized the contents and formats of interim reports,
annual reports, and prospectuses for rights offerings. These new
rules greatly improved the quality of listed ﬁrm’s disclosures. In
August 2001, the CSRC introduced an independent director rule
that made it mandatory for listed ﬁrms to include independent
directors on their boards. In January 2002, the CSRC and SETC
(State Economic and Trade Commission) jointly issued the ‘‘Codes
of Corporate Governance” and the CSRC began conducting regular
inspections on listed ﬁrm compliance. In the meantime, the CSRC
engineered the emergence of institutional investors in China. In
1999, the Investment Fund Law was added to the legislative agen-
da of the People’s Congress. By the end of 2005, institutional inves-
tors held roughly 20% of all tradable shares in Chinese listed ﬁrms.
Also, the security analysts industry emerged and CSRC issued sev-
eral rules in 1998 to regulate the industry.
Another important development that occurred during this per-
iod was that the government came to appreciate the weakness of
the IPO quota system and replaced it with an approval system in
March 2001. Under the approval system, the ability of IPO candi-
dates to generate sustainable proﬁts became important in deter-
mining the success or failure of the applications for SIP (Kao
et al., 2009).
Taken together, the regulatory, corporate governance, and mar-
ket institution developments outlined above are likely to have had
a positive impact on China’s stock market. Morey et al. (2009) ﬁnd
that improvements in corporate governance result in signiﬁcantly
higher valuations in emerging markets. Berkman et al. (2005)
examine the wealth effects of regulatory changes made by the
CSRC between 2000 and 2002. They ﬁnd that these new regula-
tions signiﬁcantly increased ﬁrm value, and that ﬁrms with weak
governance beneﬁted disproportionately more relative to ﬁrms
with strong governance. Similarly, these new developments may
well have improved the effectiveness of the SIP process in our more
recent sample.
The third reason for conducting this study is that the analysis
we carry out using a matched sample approach, which is not em-
ployed in earlier China SIP studies, may allow us to reach more reli-
able conclusions. In SIP studies, it is important to construct a
matched sample of SOE ﬁrms that have not gone through the SIP
process, i.e., purely state-owned enterprises. Privatization usually
comes in waves and is completed within a short time span. A pure
pre- and post-privatization comparison could thus be confounded
by factors other than privatization itself, such as the economic cy-
cle or other temporary shocks to the overall economy.
To better evaluate whether SIP improves SOE performance, we
should observe the pre- and post-SIP differences in performance
measures for a SIP sample, as well as the pre-post differences in
the same measures for a matched SOE sample. As long as the
pre-post differences in the measures for the SIP sample are signif-
icantly better than those for the matched SOE sample, we can con-
clude that SIP improves ﬁrm performance. In other words, our
question should be ‘‘did SIP ﬁrms perform better than similar SOEs
that were not partially privatized?”
In China, another confounding factor is that the government
tends to select better-performing SOEs to go public, and because
China has thousands of SOE ﬁrms to choose from, the pre-SIP prof-
itability of SIP ﬁrms is likely to be much higher than that in other
countries. For example, Megginson et al. (1994) ﬁnd that the med-
ian pre-SIP ROS of the SIP ﬁrms they examined was 4.4%, while
D’Souza and Megginson (1999) calculated the median pre-SIP
ROS of the SIP ﬁrms in their sample as 5.0%. In contrast, the median
pre-SIP ROS of the SIP ﬁrms in our sample was 18.5%. As Fama and
French (2000) note, ‘‘there is a strong presumption in economics
that, in a competitive environment, proﬁtability is mean-revert-
ing.”12 Furthermore, they ﬁnd that mean reversion is faster when
proﬁtability is further from its mean in either direction. Other stud-
ies, such as those conducted by Barber and Lyon (1996) and Nissim
and Penman (2001), also document that earnings tend to revert to
the mean.13 Knapp et al. (2006) ﬁnd that the impact of mean rever-
sion of bank proﬁtability is signiﬁcant for post-merger performance.
Dutta and Jog (2009) also consider this issue in their study of the
long-term performance of acquiring ﬁrms. The mean reversion pat-
tern of proﬁtability suggests that when there is a selection bias prob-
lem in a SIP sample such that pre-SIP proﬁtability is high, post-SIP
proﬁtability will decline towards the mean level, even if the SIP
has no effect on proﬁtability.
To remedy these potential problems, we match SIP ﬁrms with
SOE ﬁrms based on industry, size, and performance in the pre-SIP
year. According to Barber and Lyon (1996) and Megginson and Net-
ter (2001), a matching method is appropriate when pre-event
operating performance is unusual and can be used to control for
the mean reversion problem. The matched sample approach also
teases out the impact of economy-wide ﬂuctuations on changes
in SIP ﬁrm performance.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
Our data for unlisted SOEs were collected by the State Statistical
Bureau of China and include balance sheet and income statement
information for all manufacturing ﬁrms classiﬁed as SOEs between
1998 and 2003. To be included as a matching candidate in our
analysis, we require that there be sufﬁcient ﬁnancial information
available on the SOE in question and that it maintained its state-
12 An earlier argument for mean reversion of proﬁtability is attributed to Stigler
(1963, p. 54): ‘‘There is no more important proposition in economic theory than that,
under competition, the rate of return on investment tend toward equality in all
industries.”
13 Other reasons exist for mean-reverting earnings. For example, Barber and Lyon
(1996) argue that accounting methods can introduce a temporary component to the
performance measurement, such as non-recurring income or expenses. When the
temporary component dissipates, performance will revert to the mean. Mean
reversion could also be a simple statistical phenomenon.
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owned status for the whole six-year period. These requirements
leave us with 7761 state-owned ﬁrms as matching candidates for
each year in our sample period.
Our SIP sample is taken from the CCER China Stock Database.
The CCER China Stock Database has records on 359 ﬁrms that went
public on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between
1999 and 2002. Our SIP sample period begins in 1999 and ends
in 2002. This period is shorter than the sample period for our
matching SOEs because for every SIP ﬁrm, we need to use ﬁnancial
data from the year before its IPO year to choose a matched SOE,
and we need to measure post-SIP performance based on ﬁnancial
data from at least one year after the IPO year.
From the initial IPO sample of 359 ﬁrms, we then exclude (1)
non-manufacturing ﬁrms; and (2) ﬁrms that were not wholly
state-owned enterprises before the IPO. We retain only manufac-
turing ﬁrms because the matching SOE ﬁrms are from the manu-
facturing industry. This criterion mitigates possible industry
effects. We keep only pure SOE ﬁrms that went public due to our
research focus on share issue privatizations. Earlier works on Chi-
na’s SIP use all IPO ﬁrms as their SIP sample, thereby introducing
noise by including ﬁrms that were not SOEs before their IPO. Our
ﬁnal SIP sample consists of 149 ﬁrms.
3.2. Methodology
The methodology commonly used in the SIP literature (e.g.,
Megginson et al., 1994; Sun and Tong, 2003) is to compare the
three-year performance before SIP with the three-year perfor-
mance after SIP, excluding the SIP year. We design our methodol-
ogy in a similar fashion but also take our matched SOE ﬁrms into
account.
Firstly, for each SIP ﬁrm, we compute its pre-SIP and post-SIP
ﬁnancial performance measures (total assets, return on sales,
etc.) as their respective annual averages for each ﬁrm during the
pre- or post-SIP period. The pre- and post-SIP periods are at most
three years, respectively, but could be as short as one year because
our data on matching SOEs are limited to the 1998–2003 period,
and our SIP sample ranges from 1999 to 2002.
Secondly, in each year from 1999 to 2002, we compute notional
pre-SIP and post-SIP ﬁnancial and performance measures for each
SOE, as if the SOEwentpublic in the sameyear as itsmatchedSIPﬁrm.
Thirdly, we choose one matching SOE for each SIP ﬁrm. We ﬁrst
select SOEs with pre-SIP total assets within +/ 30% of the total as-
sets of the SIP ﬁrm during the same period, and with pre-SIP prof-
itability within +/ 30% of the proﬁtability of the SIP ﬁrm during
the same period. Then, from among the surviving candidates we
choose the one with the smallest difference in proﬁtability from
the SIP ﬁrm. Using ROS to measure proﬁtability enables us to ﬁnd
matching SOEs for 147 SIP ﬁrms.14
To evaluate the effects of SIP on ﬁrm proﬁtability, we examine
the difference between SIP ﬁrms and matched SOE ﬁrms in terms
of proﬁtability changes around the SIP year. The examined variable
is as follows:
Dprof ¼ DprofSIP  DprofMatch
¼ ðprofpostSIP  profpreSIPÞ  ðprofpostmatching
 profprematchingÞ ð1Þ
where Prof stands for proﬁtability. We call this variable adjusted
proﬁtability (e.g. adjusted-ROS). Adjusted proﬁtability measures
whether SIP ﬁrms became more or less proﬁtable than SOEs that
did not go through the SIP process. If adjusted proﬁtability is
positive, we conclude that partial privatization through the stock
market resulted in a greater improvement in ﬁrm proﬁtability than
that experienced by SOEs that remained wholly state-owned.
Our main ﬁnancial measure for proﬁtability is return on sales
(ROS), deﬁned as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided
by sales.15 The reason we rely on ROS to measure proﬁtability is that
there is an important difference between Chinese SIP and SIP in other
countries. In China, SIP is a primary offering process, rather than the
secondary offering process as in most other countries. This difference
is important when we study performance changes resulting from SIP.
In a secondary offering, the government sells its equity holdings in an
SOE and receives the proceeds, and the only immediate impact on the
SOE is the change in shareholder(s). By contrast, in a primary offering,
the government does not sell any shares in the SOE. Instead, the SOE-
turned listed company issues new shares directly to private investors
and keeps the proceeds of the offering for itself. As such, one of the
direct results of a primary offering is an equivalent increase in the
ﬁrm’s assets and shareholders’ equity. Put differently, a secondary
offering does not change the asset base of the company, whereas a
primary offering results in a larger company.
This characteristic of China’s SIP process immediately poses a
serious problem for us in measuring performance changes from
the pre- to post-SIP period. Many performance measures used in
studies of non-Chinese SIP (e.g., D’Souza and Megginson, 1999)
are inappropriate for calculating performance changes in Chinese
SIP ﬁrms.
First, most ﬁrm size-related measures are inappropriate in the
Chinese context because the size of SIP ﬁrms grew by the amount
of proceeds received from the issuance of new shares, which on
average was about 40% of the SIP ﬁrm’s total assets. As Sun and
Tong (2003) and Wang et al. (2004) show, with a larger asset base
and presumably better asset quality, it is natural for a SIP ﬁrm to
record increases in revenues, total proﬁts, total EBIT, etc. These
measures, regardless of whether they are inﬂation-adjusted, can-
not be used to ascertain whether SIP results in improved
performance.
Second, the two most widely used measures of proﬁtability, re-
turn on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), are inappropriate
for measuring changes in proﬁtability after SIP. Even if a SIP ﬁrm
does not experience any change in proﬁtability, with its enlarged
asset base and equity base after SIP, the ROA and ROE for the ﬁrm
will automatically decrease. Therefore, ROA or ROE changes are not
proper measures to draw conclusion on whether China’s SIP im-
proves ﬁrm proﬁtability or not.
There is, however, another measure of proﬁtability that does
not suffer from this bias: return on sales (ROS, deﬁned as net in-
come or EBIT divided by total sales revenues). This measure is con-
ceptually similar to another traditional measure of corporate
proﬁtability, proﬁt margin, and measures how good a ﬁrm is at
controlling costs and expenses (Nissim and Penman, 2001). Both
Sun and Tong (2003) andWang et al. (2004) use ROS as one of their
measures of proﬁtability.
For the reasons outlined above, we rely mostly on ROS to mea-
sure the proﬁtability of SIP ﬁrms in this study.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Preliminary analysis
We document some ﬁnancial performance measures for our SIP
ﬁrms around the SIP year in Table 1. All measures for each ﬁrm are
averaged over the pre- or post-SIP period. The table reports sample
14 Using a more restrictive range of +/ 25% does not change the conclusion of our
paper. Instead of matching each SIP ﬁrm to only one SOE ﬁrm, we also try matching
each SIP ﬁrm to a group of SOE ﬁrms. The results are qualitatively the same.
15 Our deﬁnition of ROS is slightly different from that of Sun and Tong (2003), where
ROS is deﬁned as net income divided by sales. Our SOE database does not include tax
information or a ‘‘net income” item.
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medians and means for all SIP ﬁrms in the pre- and post-SIP peri-
ods, as well as the changes in these measures. We use Wilcoxon
statistics to test whether the median changes are statistically sig-
niﬁcant and use proportion Z-statistics to test whether the propor-
tion of positive changes is greater than 50%.
The median (mean) sales revenue for the 149 SIP ﬁrms in-
creased from RMB 505 (272) million before SIP to RMB 866 (494)
million after SIP. A Wilcoxon test of 15.27 shows that the increase
is statistically signiﬁcant. 136 of the 149 ﬁrms experienced in-
creases in sales revenues after SIP and a proportion Z-test shows
that the number of increases is statistically signiﬁcantly greater
than the number of decreases. Similar increases are also evident
for total assets and EBIT.
On the other hand, both ROS and ROA decreased after SIP. ROS
decreased from a median (mean) of 18.5% (18.3%) to 12.3% (12.2%),
and ROA decreased from a median (mean) of 13.3% (12.4%) to 5.6%
(5.7%). Wilcoxon statistics indicate that the decreases in ROS and
ROA from the pre-SIP period to after the post-SIP period are statis-
tically signiﬁcant, while a Z-test shows that decreases outnum-
bered increases.
Table 1 also reports similar results for all IPO ﬁrms between
1999 and 2002. For all IPO ﬁrms, sales revenues, total assets, and
EBIT increased after the IPO, whereas ROS and ROA decreased. This
post-IPO underperformance of Chinese ﬁrms is consistent with evi-
dence from other countries (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998) and cautions us
that we should be careful in concluding that SIP did not improve
ﬁrm proﬁtability based purely on the proﬁtability changes mea-
sured in SIP ﬁrms themselves. The results shown in Table 1 are
qualitatively similar to those reported by Sun and Tong (2003)
and Wang et al. (2004), although our sample period is more re-
cent.16 Our evidence indicates that even in the more recent period,
SIP did not result in an absolute improvement in ﬁrm performance.
Table 2 presents medians for total assets, sales, EBIT, ROS, and
ROA for all potential matching SOE candidates in the period be-
tween 1998 and 2003. We have 7761 SOEs available in each year.
These SOEs have average total assets of around RMB 22 million and
average sales of around RMB 8 million. Given that the typical SOE
are much smaller than the typical SIP ﬁrm, it is important that we
control for ﬁrm size when we choose matching SOEs for SIP ﬁrms.
The proﬁtability of SOEs, measured by median EBIT, ROS, and
ROA, declined dramatically between 1998 and 2003. Median EBIT
declined from 0.112 million Yuan in 1998 to 0.020 million Yuan
in 2003, median ROS declined from 2.4% to 0.5%, while median
ROA declined from 1.1% to 0.3%. This decline in SOE proﬁtability
during what was a period of rapid economic growth in China is
perplexing. If anything, it shows that the reform of the state sector
was far from successful, and that further reform, such as the priv-
atization of SOEs through SIP, is warranted. It also highlights the
importance of adopting a matching approach when studying the
impact of SIP on ﬁrm proﬁtability. Our data show that while SIP
ﬁrms may not have achieved a net increase in proﬁtability, their
performance may have deteriorated even further had they re-
mained wholly state-owned.
We also report ROS and ROA in the notional pre-SIP period (as if
the SOE went through SIP in that year) for all SOEs in the last two
columns of Table 2. Notional pre-SIP ROS was used in constructing
the matched sample. Over our sample period, a decline in these
measures among the SOEs is evident as well.
We argue in section two that the mean reversion of corporate
proﬁtability is one factor that can affect the results of SIP studies
if not properly controlled for. Figs. 1 and 2 clearly indicate that
the proﬁtability of both Chinese SOEs and Chinese SIP ﬁrms tends
to be mean-reverting.
For each year between 1998 and 2003, we sort all SOEs into ten
deciles based on their ROS (year T = 0), then hold these deciles con-
stant and observe their median ROS in the following 4 years (if
available). Fig. 1 show that SOE ﬁrms in their top ROS decile in year
0 experienced substantial decline of ROS subsequently, while SOE
ﬁrms in their bottom ROS decile in year 0 experienced substantial
Table 1
Financial performance of manufacturing SIPs and all IPOs around stock listing.
Sample Variables Median (mean) pre_SIP Median (mean) post_SIP Median (mean) change Wilcoxon test +/ (proportion Z-test)
Manufacturing SIP Sales 505 866 361 15.27*** 136/13
(obs = 149) (272) (494) (187) (10.077)***
Total Assets 603 1494 891 21.21*** 149/0
(382) (1085) (660) (12.207)***
EBIT 75 101 25 5.09*** 104/45
(51) (64) (15) (4.833)***
ROS 0.185 0.123 0.062 11.56*** 29/120
(0.183) (0.122) (0.041) (7.455)***
ROA 0.133 0.056 0.077 19.07*** 7/142
(0.124) (0.057) (0.064) (11.060)***
Whole IPO Sales 308 530 216 23.03*** 325/34
(obs = 359) (750) (1379) (630) (15.358)***
Total Assets 455 1213 721 32.85*** 357/2
(1328) (2657) (1329) (18.736)***
EBIT 54 69 17 7.5*** 247/112
(121) (186) (65) (7.125)***
ROS 0.185 0.123 0.049 16.77*** 68/291
(0.22) (0.119) (0.101) (11.769)***
ROA 0.113 0.056 0.059 25.34*** 32/327
(0.127) (0.054) (0.073) (15.570)***
This table reports performance changes for manufacturing SIP ﬁrms and for all IPO ﬁrms around stock listing between 1999 and 2002. IPO sample includes all IPOs on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges while the manufacturing SIP sample includes SIP ﬁrms in manufacturing industry that were wholly state-owned before the share
issuance. EBIT is earnings before interests and taxes; ROS is EBIT divided by total sales; ROA is EBIT divided by total assets. Total assets and Sales are in million Yuan. Pre-SIP
and Post-SIP periods are deﬁned as three years before or three years after the SIP year (SIP year excluded). We report sample median and mean (in parenthesis) of each
variable in the Pre- or Post-SIP period. The Wilcoxon Z-test is used to test for any statistically signiﬁcant changes in the median value (paired observation). The last column
shows the number of positive versus negative changes, and the proportion Z-test is used to test whether the proportion of positive change is greater than 50%.
*** Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level.
16 Note that Sun and Tong (2003) and Wang et al. (2004) included all IPO ﬁrms,
while most of our analyses focus only on manufacturing SIP ﬁrms. However, Table 1
indicates that within our sample, the decline of ROS in the manufacturing SIP sample
(0.062) is more than that in the all IPO sample (0.049).
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increase of ROS.17 In Fig. 2, we conduct the same analysis for all SIP
ﬁrms between 1998 and 2003; the pattern of mean reversion is sim-
ilar. Consistent with the prediction of Fama and French (2000), the
extreme deciles tend to show faster and greater reversion to the
mean.
When the Chinese government started to implement its share
issue privatization program to reform its SOEs in the early 1990s,
it intentionally chose more proﬁtable SOEs to privatize. For one
thing, offering shares in more proﬁtable SOEs was more readily
acceptable to private investors and was likely to result in higher
share prices. Hence, SIP ﬁrms tend to be drawn from the top deciles
of SOEs in terms of ROS and ROA, and their proﬁtability tends to
revert to the mean rather quickly. Table 3 shows that this is indeed
the case.
In Table 3, we compare our SIP ﬁrms and SOE ﬁrms in terms of
pre-SIP total assets, ROS, and ROA. Our procedure for doing so is as
follows, using total assets as an example. In each year between
1999 and 2002, we sort all SOEs into ten deciles based on their
pre-SIP period total assets (Total Asset_pre). The ﬁrst two rows of
Panel A in Table 3 report the decile medians for notional pre-SIP
and post-SIP period total assets. We then assign each of the 149
SIP ﬁrms to one of the ten deciles if the pre-SIP period total assets
of the SIP ﬁrm falls into the Total Assets_pre range for that decile. #
of SIP represents the number of SIP ﬁrms in a decile, and % of SIP
sample is the same number divided by 149.
The ﬁrst observation we make based on Table 3 is that consis-
tent with Figs. 1 and 2, the proﬁtability of SOEs tends to be
mean-reverting. SOE ﬁrms in more proﬁtable pre-SIP ROS deciles
tend to experience lower post-SIP ROS, while SOE ﬁrms in less
proﬁtable pre-SIP ROS deciles achieve higher ROS in the post-SIP
period. These trends hold true in spite of the fact that across all
deciles, total assets do not appear to have changed much between
the two periods.
The key evidence presented in Table 3 is that SIP ﬁrms were
mostly larger, more proﬁtable SOEs before they went through
the SIP process. Of the 149 SIP ﬁrms, 116 (77.9%) are in the larg-
est 10% of all SOEs, and 31 (20.8%) are in the second largest 10%
of all SOEs. Even the two remaining SIP ﬁrms are large
enterprises.
In terms of pre-SIP period proﬁtability, when measured by ROS,
115 (77.2%) of the SIP ﬁrms are in the most proﬁtable 10% of all
SOEs and 26 (17.4%) are in the second most proﬁtable 10%. Even
the remaining SIP ﬁrms are more proﬁtable than the average
SOE. Measured by ROA, the distribution is even more skewed, with
138 (92.6%) of SIP ﬁrms in the top 10% and all of the remaining
ﬁrms in the second most proﬁtable 10%.
Taken together, Table 3 and Figs. 1 and 2 show that our SIP sam-
ple has an extremely severe selection bias problem. SIP ﬁrms were
highly proﬁtable large SOEs in the pre-SIP period, and even in the
absence of SIP, their proﬁtability tends to deteriorate in the next
few years. This result, which we document in Table 1, conﬁrms
the ﬁndings of Sun and Tong (2003) and Wang et al. (2004). We
now turn to measuring SIP effects with a matching sample
approach.
4.2. Adjusted ROS for SIP ﬁrms
Our main results on the impact of SIP on ﬁrm proﬁtability are
reported in Table 4. In Table 4, we report adjusted ROS as described
in Eq. (1), which is the change in SIP ﬁrm proﬁtability minus the
change in SOE proﬁtability from the pre-SIP period to the post-
SIP period. ROS is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes
(EBIT) to sales. As we argue earlier, this is probably the only appro-
priate measure of proﬁtability for SIP ﬁrms in the Chinese setting
because it is not affected by the infusion of IPO proceeds. Sun
and Tong (2003) and Wang et al. (2004) endorse this approach
by using ROS as one of their proﬁtability measures.
In Panel A of Table 4, we report pre- and post-SIP period ROS for
both the SIP sample and the matched SOE sample, as well as the
changes in this measure. The median (mean) pre-SIP ROS for SIP
ﬁrms is 18.4% (18.6%). Post-SIP ROS drops to a median (mean) of
12.2 (12.3%). The difference in these two medians, 4.1%, is statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 1% level according to the Wilcoxon test of
11.41. The proportion Z-test shows that the number of SIP ﬁrms
that suffered a decline in proﬁtability after SIP outnumbered those
that enjoyed increased proﬁtability. Based on similar results, Sun
and Tong (2003) and Wang et al. (2004) conclude that SIP did
not improve SOE proﬁtability.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for potential matching SOE ﬁrms.
Year Total Assets Sales EBIT ROS ROA ROS_pre ROA_pre
1998 22.014 8.251 0.112 0.024 0.011
1999 22.450 8.259 0.090 0.020 0.009 0.024 0.011
2000 23.304 9.013 0.099 0.019 0.009 0.021 0.010
2001 23.471 8.565 0.056 0.013 0.006 0.019 0.009
2002 22.913 8.630 0.031 0.009 0.004 0.014 0.007
2003 22.335 8.411 0.020 0.005 0.003
This table presents the median of Total Assets, Sales, EBIT, ROS and ROA of potential
matching SOE ﬁrms by year between 1998 and 2003. Total assets and Sales are in
million Yuan. We have 7761 ﬁrms that remain state-owned during 1998–2003 with
necessary ﬁnancial information in each year. EBIT is earnings before interests and
taxes, ROS is EBIT divided by total sales; ROA is EBIT divided by total assets. For each
year between 1999 and 2002, we also report the notional pre-SIP ROS and ROA (as if
these SOEs went SIP in that year). Pre-SIP periods are deﬁned as three years before
the speciﬁc year but are limited within 1998-2003. ROS_pre and ROA_pre are the
average of ROS and ROA in the pre-SIP period.
Fig. 1. The mean reversion of return on sales in SOEs. In each year between 1998
and 2003, we sort 7671 SOE ﬁrms into ten deciles based on their return on sales
(T = 0), then we keep the deciles constant and report median ROS for the top, middle
and bottom deciles for the next four years.
Fig. 2. The mean reversion of return on sales in SIP Firms. In each year between
1998 and 2003, we sort all SIP ﬁrms in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges into
ten deciles based on their return on sales (T = 0), then we keep the deciles constant
and report median ROS for the top, middle and bottom deciles for the next four
years.
17 Figs. 1 and 2 only show the top, middle and bottom deciles. Other deciles
experience expected pattern of mean reversion as well.
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However, Panel A of Table 4 also shows that during the same
period, SOEs that did not go through the SIP process experienced
a greater decline in proﬁtability, with median (mean) ROS falling
from 18.5% (18.5%) in the notional pre-SIP period to 9%
(12.1%18) in the notional post-SIP period. The median change in
ROS (7.4%) for the SOEs is statistically signiﬁcant as well. The med-
ian (mean) adjusted ROS for SIP ﬁrms is thus 2.5% (24.3%), and the
median adjusted ROS is also statistically signiﬁcant. The proportion
Z-test result indicates that more SIP ﬁrms enjoyed a positive ad-
justed ROS than a negative one. Our results clearly show that during
our sample period, share issue privatized ﬁrms performed better
than similar SOEs that remained state-owned in terms of higher re-
turn on sales.
The third row of Panel A shows that the median (mean) ROS dif-
ference between SIP ﬁrms and SOE ﬁrms in the pre-SIP period
(when matching is conducted) is 0% (0.1%), and the Wilcoxon test
shows that the median difference is not statistically different from
zero. This indicates that our matching procedure produces reason-
able SOE matches.
In Panel A of Table 4, the pre-SIP period and post-SIP period for
each ﬁrm may not include an equal number of years due to data
availability. For example, a 1999 SIP ﬁrm’s pre-SIP period is one
year, but its post-SIP period includes three years. To avoid this
measurement window problem, we divide our SIP sample into
three sub-samples. The three sub-samples include SIP ﬁrms with
equal length pre- and post-SIP periods of one year, two years,
Table 3
The comparison of pre-SIP performance between SIP ﬁrms and SOEs.
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Panel A: deciles sorted by pre-SIP total assets
Total Assets_pre 1.2 3.4 6.6 11.2 17.9 29.0 46.5 76.6 149.1 480.3
Total Assets_post 1.3 3.5 6.7 11.5 18.2 29.4 47.6 77.6 154.6 549.4
# of SIP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 31 116
% of SIP Sample 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.3 20.8 77.9
Panel B: deciles sorted by pre-SIP ROS
ROS_pre 0.562 0.171 0.058 0.005 0.012 0.027 0.043 0.064 0.094 0.175
ROS_post 0.241 0.075 0.028 0.000 0.005 0.015 0.024 0.034 0.045 0.073
# of SIP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 26 115
% of SIP Sample 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 4.7 17.4 77.2
Panel C: deciles sorted by pre-SIP ROA
ROA_pre 0.081 0.034 0.014 0.001 0.005 0.013 0.022 0.033 0.051 0.105
ROA_post 0.033 0.014 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.019 0.028 0.056
# of SIP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 138
% of SIP Sample 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.4 92.6
This table compares the pre-SIP ﬁrm characteristics of SIP ﬁrms with notional pre-SIP ﬁrm characteristics of SOEs. In each year between 1999 and 2002, we sort SOE ﬁrms into
10 deciles based on their notional pre-SIP period total assets, ROS, or ROA. Total Assets_pre and Total Assets_post refer to the median pre-SIP or post-SIP period total assets for
each decile. Then every SIP ﬁrm is assigned into a decile based on its Total Assets_pre, and # of SIP is the number of SIP ﬁrms whose Total Assets_pre falls into the range of that
decile.% of SIP sample is # of SIP divided by 149. All variables are deﬁned similarly for ROS and ROA.
Table 4
Adjusted ROS for SIP ﬁrms.
Median (Mean) Pre_SIP Median (Mean) Post_SIP Median (Mean) Change Wilcoxon Test +/ (Proportion Z-test)
Panel A: pre- and post-SIP ROS of SIP and SOE samples
SIP sample 0.184 0.122 0.041 11.412*** 29/118
(0.186) (0.123) (0.063) (7.341)***
SOE sample 0.185 0.09 0.074 8.492*** 30/117
(0.185) (0.121) (0.306) (7.176)***
SIP–SOE 0.000 0.031 0.025 3.417*** 94/53
(0.001) (0.244) (0.243) (3.382)***
Wilcoxon test 0.542 3.440*** 3.417***
Panel B: adjusted ROS for different measures of pre- and post-SIP periods
One year 0.038 3.769*** 93/54
(obs: 147) (0.468) (3.217)***
Two years 0.029 2.672*** 71/41
(obs: 112) (0.047) (2.835)***
Three years 0.036 2.287** 55/33
(obs: 88) (0.003) (2.345)**
Panel C: adjusted ROS for different modes of privatization
Control 0.044 2.669*** 44/21
Privatization (0.021) (2.852)***
Revenue 0.024 2.209** 50/32
Privatization (0.419) (1.988)**
Wilcoxon test of group difference 0.622
This table compares ROS of SIP ﬁrms with ROS of SOEs around share issue privatization. Matched SOEs were chosen from a large unlisted SOE dataset based on pre-SIP period
total assets and ROS. Panel A reports pre-SIP and post-SIP ROS for SIP sample and matched SOE sample, where post-SIP period could vary from one year to three years. Panel B
reports adjusted ROS for SIP sample, separately for SIP ﬁrms whose post-SIP period is one, two or three years. Panel C divides the whole SIP sample into two groups according
to whether the government still controls the SIP ﬁrms (i.e. holding more than 50% of common shares), and reports adjusted ROS for the two groups. Wilcoxon Z-statistic is
used to test for any signiﬁcant change in the median value (paired observation) of proﬁtability. The last column reports the number of positive versus negative changes and
the proportion Z-statistic on whether the proportion of positive change is different with 50%.
** Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level.
18 Outliers in the SOE sample contributed to the large negative ROS mean.
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and three years, respectively. Panel B of Table 4 reports the ad-
justed ROS ﬁgures for these three sub-samples. The median (mean)
adjusted ROS for these three sub-samples are 3.8% (46.8%) for the
one-year window, 2.9% (4.7%) for the two-year window, and 3.6%
(0.3%) for the three-year window. All three median adjusted
ROS measures are statistically signiﬁcant, and a proportion Z-test
for all three sub-samples indicates that more SIP ﬁrms experienced
positive adjusted ROS than negative adjusted ROS.
The improvement in ROS after share issue privatization is not
affected by whether the SIP is a control privatization (where the
government retains less than 50% of the ﬁrm’s shares) or a revenue
privatization (where the government retains more than 50% of the
ﬁrm’s shares). Panel C of Table 4 shows that the mean (median) ad-
justed ROS for control privatization ﬁrms is 4.4% (2.1%) and 2.4%
(41.9%) for revenue privatization ﬁrms. A Wilcoxon test on the
median adjusted ROS for these two modes of privatization shows
that they are insigniﬁcantly different. Sun and Tong (2003) argue
that control privatizations are expected to yield superior perfor-
mance improvements to revenue privatizations (D’Souza and
Megginson, 1999). Our result does not support this argument.
We are not surprised to ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant difference
between the effects of these two privatization modes on SOE prof-
itability in China. Even if the government retains a holding of less
than 50% of a SIP ﬁrm, it remains the SIP ﬁrm’s controlling share-
holder in most cases. D’Souza and Megginson (1999) argue that
selling voting control to outside investors is the most conducive
way to efﬁciency improvements. The Chinese government clearly
has not sold control of SIP ﬁrms to private investors, even in ﬁrms
in which it is not a majority shareholder.
4.3. Multivariate analysis of the impact of institutional changes on the
SIP process
So far, our analyses show that SIP ﬁrms experienced a smaller
decline in proﬁtability during our sample period than their
matched SOE ﬁrms. While this indicates that SIP has a positive im-
pact on ﬁrm proﬁtability,19 the impact we measure is not large en-
ough to deliver SIP ﬁrms an absolute increase in proﬁtability.
Nevertheless, as we have argued, our sample period can be dis-
tinguished from the earlier SIP period in that there was a fast build-
up of laws, regulations, and corporate governance mechanisms
that protect investors’ interests during the period we study. Both
the regulators and the market became more mature than they
were during the initial SIP period, which corresponds to the Sun
and Tong (2003) sample. We argue that these changes are likely
to have bolstered the chances of success of the SIP process in the
period we analyze.20
To understand the effect of changes in the investor protection
environment on the success of the SIP process, we run a set of mul-
tivariate regressions.
First, we observe that because China’s investor protection laws
and regulations, as well as its corporate governance mechanisms,
were mainly established during our sample period, we run a sim-
ple regression where adjusted ROS is regressed on a time variable,
T. T represents a time trend that takes the values of 1–4 for 1999–
2002, respectively. If investor protection improved during this per-
iod and the stock market provided a meaningful amount of inves-
tor protection, we should observe that the coefﬁcient on T is
positive, meaning that over time, as investor protection improves,
the relative performance of SIP ﬁrms to that of SOEs increases.
The regression result is reported in the second column of Table
5. The coefﬁcient on T is 0.061 and it is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
This result supports the view that the SIP process improved, even
during our short sample period, indicating that the institutional
changes made during this period might have strengthened the po-
sitive impact of SIP.
Second, we use regression analysis to examine the impact of an
important step taken to protect minority shareholders’ interests,
the introduction of a rule mandating the appointment of indepen-
dent directors to the boards of Chinese listed ﬁrms.
The CSRC established the independent director rule on August
16, 2001. To guarantee their independence, independent directors
and their immediate families (both the director’s family and her or
his spouse’s family) were not permitted to work for or own a sig-
niﬁcant number of shares in the listed ﬁrms on whose boards they
sat, own a signiﬁcant stake in any of the ﬁrm’s controlling share-
holders or other major shareholders, or provide consulting services
to the listed ﬁrm or any of its afﬁliates. The independent directors
appointed to the board of any listed ﬁrm were also to include one
director with an accounting background. The independent director
rule gives independent directors a broad range of power over ma-
jor decisions, such as the hiring of external auditors, the approval
of major related party transactions, the nomination of senior exec-
utives, and the design of executive compensation plans.
Table 5
Multivariate analysis on performance change.
DROS DROS DROS DROS
T 0.061*
(0.031)
INDEP 0.074** 0.066**
(0.030) (0.031)
BOARD 0.025* 0.023
(0.015) (0.015)
INDEP/BOARD 0.530*
(0.292)
SHARE_HIRF 0.516 0.578*
(0.345) (0.346)
STATE 0.060 0.059
(0.152) (0.152)
FOREIGN 0.022 0.009
(0.124) (0.125)
Constant 0.043 0.294** 0.405** 0.213**
(0.083) (0.148) (0.169) (0.107)
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.039 0.037 0.025
The table reports estimation results of the multivariate analysis on performance
changes. The dependent variable DROS is adjusted ROS. T represents time trend
taking 1–4 as for year 1999 to year 2002, respectively. STATE is the retained state
ownership after SIP. FOREIGN takes the value of one if the ﬁrm issues foreign shares
and zero otherwise. BOARD is the size of ﬁrm board. INDEP is the number of
independent board members. SHARE_HIRF is the Hirﬁndhal index of large share-
holders, deﬁned as the sum of squares of stock percentages of the ﬁrst to ﬁfth
largest shareholders. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
19 The robustness of this ﬁnding depends on the assumption that the SIP ﬁrms and
the matched SOEs are drawn from the same population of SOEs. While our matching
approach controls for industry, size, and pre-event performance, as suggested in
earlier studies, two other factors might still compromise the efﬁcacy of our procedure.
First, SIP ﬁrms might have managed earnings upwards to attain SIP approval
(Ahronay et al., 2000); however, this factor, if present, is likely to work against a
ﬁnding of better performance among SIP ﬁrms, as managed earnings tend to revert to
the mean more quickly. Second, because SIP ﬁrms are likely to have been more
politically connected to the government than matched SOEs, allowing them to
achieve better performance through such connections rather than through the SIP
process. However, Fan et al. (2007) ﬁnd that political connections are associated with
poorer, not better, performance in China. Even so, there may be other factors we have
not considered that render the two samples inherently different, so our results should
be interpreted with caution.
20 As we have pointed out earlier, we aim to re-examine the effect of share issue
privatization on ﬁrm proﬁtability. Ideally, we should also include the Sun and Tong
(2003) sample in our study, and compare whether the adjusted ROS for our sample is
greater than the similarly constructed adjusted ROS for the Sun and Tong (2003)
sample. However, the State Statistical Bureau of China database does not cover the
Sun and Tong (2003) sample period, making what would have been a meaningful
comparison impossible.
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As such, the independent director rule for the ﬁrst time brought
third-party checks and balances to the major decision-making
activities of Chinese business enterprises, and its impact should
not be underestimated in an economy in which insider control is
a typical feature.21
To test the impact of the independent director rule on our results,
we regress adjusted ROS on the number of independent directors
(INDEP) or the percentage of independent directors on the board
(INDEP/BOARD) and a set of control variables. The control variables
include the following: BOARD (the size of the ﬁrm’s board);
SHARE_HIRF (the Hirﬁndahl index of large shareholders, deﬁned
as the sum of the squares of the stock percentages held by each of
the ﬁve largest shareholders, in which a higher SHARE_HIRF repre-
sents a more concentrated shareholding); STATE (the level of state
ownership retained after SIP); and FOREIGN (an independent vari-
able taking the value one if the SIP ﬁrm is also listed on a foreign ex-
change, including Hong Kong, and zero otherwise).
SHARE_HIRF measures the concentration of ownership in the
top ﬁve major shareholders. A higher concentration of ownership
exacerbates the entrenchment problem and makes the ﬁrm more
susceptible to expropriation. Thus, we expect a higher concentra-
tion of ownership to have a negative impact on the proﬁtability
of SIP ﬁrms. SIP ﬁrms that cross-list on a foreign exchange are sub-
ject to the investor protection and corporate governance mecha-
nisms of the foreign exchange concerned, which tend to be a
better source of discipline than China’s domestic stock market, so
we expect it to have a positive effect on SIP ﬁrms. Since the prior
literature does not offer a clear explanation for the impact of
BOARD or STATE, we do not offer a prediction of their impact on
SIP ﬁrms.
The regression results are reported in Table 5. In the third col-
umn, we include only INDEP and BOARD as the independent vari-
ables. The coefﬁcient on INDEP is 0.074, which is signiﬁcant at the
5% level. The coefﬁcient on BOARD is 0.025 and is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. While having a larger board without independent
directors did not help SIP ﬁrms, independent directors help im-
prove SIP ﬁrms’ proﬁtability relative to non-SIP SOEs. In the fourth
column of Table 5, we add SHARE_HIRF, STATE, FOREIGN to INDEP
and BOARD as independent variables. Adding these ownership
structure and cross-listing variables does not change the impact
of independent directors, but BOARD becomes insigniﬁcant. None
of the added variables show any signiﬁcance in explaining the ad-
justed ROS.
Finally, we regress adjusted ROS on INDEP/BOARD, the percent-
age of independent directors on the board, and the control vari-
ables. The results are reported in the ﬁfth column of Table 5. The
coefﬁcient on INDEP/BOARD is 0.530 and is signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. Increasing the level of independent director representation
on the board improves SIP ﬁrm proﬁtability. In addition, the coef-
ﬁcient on SHARE_HIRF is 0.578 and is signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
indicating that more diversiﬁed ownership is associated with high-
er SIP ﬁrm proﬁtability.
In summary, the multivariate analyses we present indicate that
over our sample period, the SIP process became more effective in
improving ﬁrm proﬁtability. In particular, one newly established
investor protection mechanism, the independent director rule,
had a positive impact on the SIP process. SIP ﬁrms with more inde-
pendent directors, which were largely prompted to appoint such
directors as a result of the new rule, enjoyed higher adjusted ROS
than their matched SOEs.
5. Conclusions
The extant privatization literature mainly ﬁnds that privatiza-
tion is effective in improving business ﬁrm efﬁciency and proﬁt-
ability. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that
privatization might not work if it does not create major private
shareholders, or where the market does not provide a meaningful
amount of investor protection. Consistent with Shleifer and Vish-
ny’s argument, Sun and Tong (2003) and Wang et al. (2004) ﬁnd
that share issue privatized ﬁrms in China actually experienced
declining proﬁtability in the 1990s, a period in which China’s stock
market was in its infancy and modern market institutions and
mechanisms were absent.
In this paper, we re-investigate the issue of whether China’s
share issue privatization (SIP) improves the proﬁtability of former
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We examine SIP ﬁrms in a more
recent period in which the institutional environment had been
greatly improved. In addition, based on a newly available dataset
providing ﬁnancial information on China’s non-listed SOEs, we
adopt a matching sample approach not used in earlier studies on
Chinese SIP. We match a sample of 149 SIP ﬁrms in the manufac-
turing industry to SOEs that did not go through the SIP process
and investigate changes in the proﬁtability of SIP ﬁrms relative
to those in pure SOEs. In this way, we are able to measure the effect
of SIP on ﬁrm proﬁtability more precisely.
Our results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of earlier studies (Sun and
Tong, 2003; Wang et al., 2004) that the absolute level of SIP ﬁrm
proﬁtability declined after privatization, even in the more recent
period we analyze. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that SIP, as an indepen-
dent process, still has a positive effect on ﬁrm proﬁtability. Specif-
ically, SIP ﬁrms experienced a decline in ROS that was 2.5% lower
than the decline suffered by SOEs that did not go through the priv-
atization process. This result is robust to alternative proﬁtability
measurement periods, regardless of whether the SIP process was
a control privatization or a revenue privatization.
We attribute the better performance of SIP ﬁrms relative to that
of non-SIP SOEs to the institutional changes implemented in the
late 1990s and early this decade. After the ﬁnancial crisis of 1997
exposed the governance weakness of Asian securities markets, Chi-
nese regulators aggressively passed laws and regulations that im-
proved corporate governance and increased investor protection
in Chinese listed ﬁrms. The major initiatives taken include the con-
solidation of securities market regulation into the hands of the
CSRC in 1998, the enactment of the Securities Law in 1999, and
the establishment of the independent director rule in 2001.
The results presented in this paper indicate that privatization
per se might not work well in the absence of modern market insti-
tutions and mechanisms. Without proper respect for and protec-
tion of minority shareholders’ interests, partial privatization
might be used to strengthen the state (by giving the state direct
and discretionary control over private capital) rather than to
strengthen the market.
Nearly 40% of the Chinese economy, one of the largest econ-
omies in the world, is still attributed to the state sector, in spite
of the state sector being inefﬁciently run and highly unproﬁtable
(other than SOEs in the monopoly industries). Privatization of
the state sector still poses an important challenge to the Chinese
government. Collectively, our study and prior studies indicate
that the early experience of SIP in China should not be viewed
as an invalidation of the privatization process; rather, it indicates
that further improvements in investor protection and corporate
governance mechanisms are needed to make the privatization
process successful.
Allen et al. (2005) compute the LLSV creditor rights and share-
holder rights scores (La Porta et al., 1998) for China. Overall, the
21 While some Chinese ﬁrms appointed independent directors to their boards prior
to the introduction of the independent director rule, they were few and far between.
The new rule mandated that listed ﬁrms include two independent directors on their
boards by June 30, 2002 and that one-third of their boards should be made up of
independent directors by June 30, 2003.
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majority of LLSV sample countries have better creditor and share-
holder protection than China. Furthermore, in terms of enforce-
ment of investor protection laws, in the two categories for which
China’s results are given (the rule of law and government corrup-
tion), China’s measures are signiﬁcantly below the average mea-
sures for LLSV sample countries, regardless of their legal origin.
China also lacks an independent and efﬁcient judicial system with
a sufﬁcient pool of qualiﬁed legal professionals.
In summary, despite the progress that has been made in what is
still a weak institutional environment supporting China’s stock
market, our study indicates that the SIP process resulted in a rela-
tive improvement in proﬁtability among SIP ﬁrms when compared
to SOEs that remained under state control. Our study points to the
possibility that the success of the SIP process also relies on a
strong, private investor-friendly capital market. In 2005 and
2006, China went through a share reform process that made all
non-tradable shares tradable. This reform better aligns the inter-
ests of controlling shareholders with those of private investors,
as both will beneﬁt from share price appreciation that better oper-
ating performance generates. After implementing a complete set of
laws and regulations that are now comparable to those in place in
developed markets, Chinese regulators have turned their attention
to enforcement. All these positive steps may contribute to making
the ongoing SIP process more successful in the future.
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